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Non-state conflicts decreased, but remain one of the most serious threats: The number of nonstate conflicts skyrocketed in 2011. However, we have seen a decline since 2014, with 2019 marking the lowest number (8) since 2009. Nevertheless, the number of non-state conflicts is still much higher than before 2011. The number of battle deaths related to non-state conflict reached an all time high in 2017, followed by a sharp decrease. Still in 2019, 4,000 people were killed in non-state conflict battle-related events. The Middle East is characterized by fighting between highly organized actors. Syria has been the hardest hit country by non-state conflicts; in 2019, five different non-state conflicts were recorded in the country.
Increase in one-sided violence from 2018: There is a general downward trend in one-sided violence from 2005 onwards (except for 2013 and 2014). While in 2018, the number of fatalities (54) were the lowest since 1989, this number doubled (108) in 2019, mostly due to violence perpetrated by Syrian insurgents, the Islamic State (IS), and the Government of Iran.
On March 14, 2019, Tropical Cyclone Idai struck the southeast coast of Mozambique. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported that 1.85 million people needed assistance. 146,000 people were internally displaced, and Mozambique scrambled to house them in 155 temporary sites.1 The cyclone and subsequent flooding damaged 100,000 homes, destroyed 1 million acres of crops, and demolished $1 billion worth of infrastructure.2
According to UNSMIL, the LNA and affiliated forces conducted at least 850 precision air strikes by drones and another 170 by fighter-bombers between April 2019 and January 2020.2 Of these, some 60 precision air strikes were conducted reportedly by Egyptian and Emirati fighter aircraft. Meanwhile, the GNA and affiliated forces conducted roughly 250 air strikes.
The sudden and sharp growth of Turkish and Russian involvement since late 2019 has been happily absorbed by Libyan actors who are desperate not to lose. The military prowess of both countries has quickly led to them being key actors on the ground while impinging on European interests and potentially shutting the West out of any peace settlement.
Regarding the trade talks themselves, what really riles both the Trumpsters and the Democrats (moderates and progressives alike) is the very way China does business: stealing intellectual property, acquiring sensitive technology through business buyouts, fusing public and private sectors so that their companies have an unfair advantage (at least by the mores of a global capitalistic trading system), currency manipulation, and so on. Trade talks, however successful, will never be able to change those fundamentals. China can adjust its business model only at the margins.
According to court documents, in fall 2019, Frost and Cook met in an online chat group. Frost shared the idea of attacking a power grid with Cook, and within weeks, the two began efforts to recruit others to join in their plan.
The population of sub-Saharan Africa is projected to double by 2050 (99% increase). Regions that may experience lower rates of population growth between 2019 and 2050 include Oceania excluding Australia/New Zealand (56%), Northern Africa and Western Asia (46%), Australia/New Zealand (28%), Central and Southern Asia (25%), Latin America and the Caribbean (18%), Eastern and SouthEastern Asia (3%), and Europe and Northern America (2%).
The global fertility rate, which fell from 3.2 births per woman in 1990 to 2.5 in 2019, is projected to decline further to 2.2 in 2050. In 2019, fertility remains above 2.1 births per woman, on average, over a lifetime in sub-Saharan Africa (4.6), Oceania excluding Australia/New Zealand (3.4), Northern Africa and Western Asia (2.9), and Central and Southern Asia (2.4). (A fertility level of 2.1 births per woman is needed to ensure replacement of generations and avoid population decline over the long run in the absence of immigration.)
Life expectancy at birth for the world, which increased from 64.2 years in 1990 to 72.6 years in 2019, is expected to increase further to 77.1 years in 2050. While considerable progress has been made in closing the longevity differential between countries, large gaps remain. In 2019, life expectancy at birth in the least developed countries lags 7.4 years behind the global average, due largely to persistently high levels of child and maternal mortality, as well as violence, conflict and the continuing impact of the HIV epidemic.
By 2050, one in six people in the world will be over age 65 (16%), up from one in 11 in 2019 (9%). Regions where the share of the population aged 65 years or over is projected to double between 2019 and 2050 include Northern Africa and Western Asia, Central and Southern Asia, Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. By 2050, one in four persons living in Europe and Northern America could be aged 65 or over. In 2018, for the first time in history, persons aged 65 or above outnumbered children under five years of age globally. The number of persons aged 80 years or over is projected to triple, from 143 million in 2019 to 426 million in 2050.
Since 2010, 27 countries or areas have experienced a reduction of one per cent or more in the size of their populations. This drop is caused by sustained low levels of fertility. The impact of low fertility on population size is reinforced in some locations by high rates of emigration. Between 2019 and 2050, populations are projected to decrease by one per cent or more in 55 countries or areas, of which 26 may see a reduction of at least ten per cent. In China, for example, the population is projected to decrease by 31.4 million, or around 2.2 per cent, between 2019 and 2050.
As fewer young immigrants are entering agriculture, the average age of foreign-born farmworkers has risen, pulling up the average for the farm workforce as a whole. The average age of immigrant farmworkers rose by 6 years between 2006 and 2019. In contrast, the average age for U.S.-born farmworkers has remained roughly constant over this period.
According to the 2019 American Community Survey, sixty nine percent of hired farmworkers reside in counties that are defined as metro (urban). This largely reflects the fact that most of the main farming areas in California, Arizona, and other Western States lie in large counties that also include major cities and thus are defined as metropolitan. Significant numbers of farmworkers are also found in metro counties in the Great Lakes States (East North Central division) and in the South Atlantic.
Wages for nonsupervisory occupations varied little across occupations, ranging from $14.09 (for graders and sorters) to $15.36 (for equipment operators). For four out the six nonsupervisory occupations, however, wages were more than 4 percent higher in 2020 than in 2019 (not adjusted for inflation).
In the case of electricity, this would require tripling the average number of people gaining access every year from around 20 million today to over 60 million people. Grid extension and densification is the least cost option for nearly 45% of the population gaining access by 2030, mini-grids for 30% and stand-alone systems for around a quarter. LPG is used by more than half of those gaining access to clean cooking in urban areas across sub-Saharan Africa, while improved cookstoves are the preferred solution in rural areas. Electrification, biogas, ethanol and other solutions also play important roles.
This madcap race to carve up the Northeast has resulted in a patchwork of effective control, with the region split between the Assad regime and the Russians, Turkey and its proxies, and the remnants of the SDF, with varying levels of regime cooperation. The Turkish-backed groups that Ankara is relying on to secure most of the area for Turkey have shown themselves to be violent, ill-disciplined, and bent on revenge against both the SDF and the Assad regime; they have already executed prisoners and civilians.7 The risks of inadvertent clashes and further violence remain high. This end state is likely to leave the region more divided, less open to humanitarian aid, and much more dangerous for civilians.
Whatever contours eventually emerge from this race for territory, the lines of control will be fraught in the long term. As the Center for American Progress argued in an August 2019 report warning of the risks of a Turkish incursion, from a functional standpoint, Ankara has simply moved the border to a new location lacking the fencing, barriers, surveillance infrastructure, and military emplacements established along the formal border.15 The Turkish-controlled zone in northern Syria will encompass significant majority-Kurdish Syrian areas, including dense urban environments that may be difficult to secure. Many living in the region view Turkish forces as invaders, and the occupying force will likely be exposed to a prolonged insurgency, roadside bombs, and hit-and-run assassinations.
As the dust slowly settles on the Syrian debacle, one of the major structural questions will be how the United States should deal with Turkey in the wake of a near-complete breakdown in relations. Even before the latest Turkish incursion into Syria, this breakdown was on display. In March 2019, CAP described the situation in the following way:
The United States may still be able to prod things toward a less chaotic outcome in Deir Ezzor and south of the areas in which the Turks are operating and the Assad regime has returned. Distasteful as it is, this will require mediating negotiations between the SDF and Russia or, at a minimum, continuing to support the SDF in these areas to provide the group with leverage vis-a-vis Russia and the regime. The Assad regime and Russia do not have the manpower or resources necessary to immediately assume administrative control of the east of the country or take over the fight against IS. The United States could publicly state that it will maintain its dominance of the airspace east of the Euphrates River while backing the SDF remnants in their negotiations with the Russians over the handover of IS detainees and counterterrorism duties more broadly. The SDF still controls the oil fields with U.S. support, and the Euphrates continues to divide them from regime forces. The United States could reaffirm that it will police these boundaries via air power until a satisfactory deal is reached. 2b1af7f3a8
